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PROPOSAL: Compulsory Bond Purchase as Compromise to
Income Tax Rate Increases
Stanley Veliotis* and Kristen Gray**
Abstract
It is a common-held expectation that the U.S. federal government will
need to increase cash receipts over the next decade. While the highest
marginal income tax rates for many years were more than twice what
they have been in the last three decades, it is expected that political
pressures will not allow more than a modest increase in the current
marginal tax rates. This Article proposes that the formerly prevalent
higher marginal rates be reinstated on excessive personal services in-
come, which is least likely to be subject to disincentive effects. How-
ever, to address probable insurmountable political resistance, the
portion of the rate in excess of the 39.6% tax rate should be converted
to an asset for the taxpayer - U.S. savings bonds. Besides providing
the government with an injection of cash, these bonds are a form of
compulsory savings, along the lines of the Keynesian "deferred pay"
proposal. The approach provides a way for financially fortunate
Americans to reinvest in their country, a patriotic theme reminiscent
of War Bond drives of the last century, as well as a tangible commit-
ment to global lenders that such Americans share their financial risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in need of immediate cash flow with the cur-
rent global economic meltdown, two wars and national debt already at
$7.5 trillion dollars.' The deficit is expected to increase by approxi-
mately $9 trillion over the next decade, 2 which suggests that the U.S.
will be in this disadvantageous position for at least several years.
There have been a variety of suggestions to increase cash flow through
the tax law, such as increasing income tax rates, reducing marginal tax
* Assistant Professor of Accounting & Taxation, Fordham University Schools of Business.
PhD, University of Connecticut; LLM, New York University School of Law; JD, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law; BBA, Baruch College. **Graduate Student, Fordham University Gradu-
ate School of Business. BS, Boston College. We thank Mauro Viskovic and Uel Rheem for their
input into earlier drafts of this Article.
1. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States: August
31, 2009, Table 2, available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2009/opdsO8
2009.pdf [hereinafter Monthly Statement].
2. Jonathan Weisman & Deborah Solomon, Decade of Debt: $9 Trillion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26,
2009, at Al.
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benefits of itemized deductions or imposing surtaxes on specific items
such as employer-provided health insurance benefits. Despite the fact
that all of these actions may generate cash flow for the U.S. govern-
ment, they are an economic expense for the affected taxpayer and
likely will be resisted in the current political climate. In this Article,
we propose a compromise - a compulsory bond purchase program to
satisfy current governmental needs while also creating a direct benefit
for the taxpayer.
Under the proposal, taxpayers will be required to purchase govern-
ment bonds based upon a percentage of their income derived from
certain personal services beyond $500,000. The income above this
threshold will be "taxed" using a progressive rate structure starting at
45%, and increasing in 5% increments for bands of income, until
reaching a maximum marginal rate of 75%. The new charges in excess
of the 39.6% marginal income tax rate will automatically be converted
into U.S. government bonds. These bonds will receive interest annu-
ally but will not have a fixed maturity date. Instead, the principal be-
gins to be returned upon the earlier of the taxpayer's death or
reaching seventy years of age (with some hardship exceptions). How-
ever, the federal government may redeem the bonds sooner, such as in
the case of budget surpluses.
Besides providing the government with an injection of cash, these
bonds are a form of compulsory savings, along the lines of the Keyne-
sian "deferred pay" proposal advanced at the start of World War II.
The approach also provides a way for financially fortunate Americans
to reinvest in their country, a patriotic theme reminiscent of War
Bond drives of the last century, as well as a signal to global lenders
that the most successful (and often high-profile) Americans share
their financial risk. Also, by repaying the bond principal to those tax-
payers who purchased them, the proposal improves on typical scena-
rios in which government reduces tax rates in good years for all
taxpayers, not just those who paid high taxes in prior years. While
one can argue that the compulsory aspect of the bond purchases may
provide disincentives for working, or may be viewed as confiscatory in
nature, we provide counter-arguments.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the U.S. govern-
ment's need for cash flow and the difficulty in addressing this need by
increasing marginal tax rates. Part III describes the proposal to insti-
tute compulsory bond purchases. Part IV estimates how much money
may be raised annually from such a program. Part V compares the
proposal to U.S. war bonds of the last century as well as analogous
compulsory arrangements outside the U.S. Part VI addresses possible
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objections to the proposal, while Part VII highlights some implemen-
tation issues that would need to be addressed further if the proposal is
enacted.
II. U.S. GOVERNMENT'S NEED FOR INCREASED CASH FLOW
Since late 2008, when the global economic crisis unfolded, and espe-
cially after President Obama took office in 2009 and began to propose
and enact broad-sweeping legislation, the U.S. is expecting increasing
record deficits. This problem confounds what already was considered
a precarious position for the U.S. economy entering the 21st century.3
While the U.S. is already committed to spending $787 billion on stim-
ulus to address the current crisis, there have been opinions that even
more stimulus spending might be needed.4 Also, proposed legislation
for climate control and broadened health care is expected to require
even more federal outlays.5 The deficit is expected to increase by ap-
proximately $9 trillion over the next decade, which indicates that the
U.S. will be in drastic need for cash flow for the foreseeable future.6
Meanwhile, as of the end of August 2009, U.S. government bonds
held by the public totaled nearly $7.5 trillion.7 Almost half of this
debt is held by foreign countries, including $801 billion by China and
$725 billion by Japan.8 Annual interest payments on government debt
3. See, e.g., PETER G. PETERSON, RUNNING ON EMPTY: How THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLI-
CAN PARTIES ARE BANKRUPTING OUR FUTURE AND WHAT AMERICANS CAN DO ABOUT IT (Far-
rar, Straus & Giroux, 2004).
4. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Calls Grow to Increase Stimulus Spending, WALL ST. J., July 6,
2009, at Al; Jonathan Weisman & John D. McKinnon, Democrats Weigh Extending Key Parts of
Stimulus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, at A2 (noting that, in light of unemployment reaching 9.8%
(the highest since 1983), stimulus spending may reach $900 billion).
5. See, e.g., Ian Talley & Stephen Power, SENATORS TO UNVEIL DRAFT CLIMATE BILL, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at A5; Janet Adamy, The Health-Care Debate: A Clear Signal on Total Cost,
Less Clarity on How to Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at AS. These ambitious plans are
already drawing criticisms for various reasons, including their effect on the deficit. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Boskin, Obama Needs a Move to the Middle, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A15; A
SQUEAKER, WITH MORE TO COME; Climate Change, HEALTH CARE AND THE BUDGET, EcoNo-
MIST, July 4, 2009, at 24; Hal Weitzman, Hot Air Over Cap-and-trade, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009,
at 2.
6. Weisman & Solomon, supra note 2 (also citing Congressional Budget Office's more con-
servative $7 trillion projection over the same decade). For details on the CBO's budget, see
Projected Deficits and Surpluses in CBO's Baseline, August 2009, available at http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doclO521/budgetprojections.pdf. See also John D. McKinnon, Group Tied to
Obama Urge Tax Increase, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at A5 ("Republicans and some Demo-
crats also have been sounding the alarm on spending. Congressional Democrats also appear
increasingly concerned about the government's fiscal situation. House Democrats are consider-
ing including criteria for reducing long-term deficits in next year's budget resolution.").
7. Monthly Statement, supra note 1.
8. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, available at http://
www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (listing holders as of July 30, 2009).
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was $451 billion for fiscal year 2008 and $368 billion for the first
eleven months of fiscal year 2009,9 and is expected to be nearly $477
billion for fiscal year 2010.10 The combination of snowballing interest
and principal payments, further deficit spending and pressure by for-
eign countries, including their calls for other currencies to act as
global players" and reduction of foreign government purchases of
U.S. debt,12 puts the U.S. fiscal house in a more precarious situation.' 3
Even before the global economic meltdown, there were concerns
about the need to raise funds. Writing shortly before the crisis,
Professors Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija noted:
The end of 2010 ... also marks the unofficial beginning of when the
baby-boom generation begins to retire and when the fiscal pressure
of Social Security and Medicare promise to accelerate. Although
the near-term political focus will be on the fate of the Bush tax cuts
and the alternative minimum tax, what to do about the growing
long-term fiscal imbalance will almost certainly have to move to
center stage. Some have suggested that an efficient new tax might
9. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., Interest Expense on the Debt Outstanding, available at http://www.
treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/ir/ir-expense.htm. These interest payments are on all govern-
ment debt, not just debt held by the public.
10. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., Detail of Other Treasury Accounts 115, available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/offices/management/budget/budgetinbrief/fy20l0/BIB-OtherTreasuryAccounts.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Angela Monaghan, CHINESE OFFICIALS CALL FOR END To DOLLAR'S GLOBAL
DOMINANCE, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 6, 2009, at 2; Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Inevitable
End to Dollar's Reserve Role?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, at Cl; David Marsh & Andy Seaman,
China's Love-hate Relationship with the Dollar, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at 9.
12. Floyd Norris, Asia Reduces Its Appetite for U.S. Debt; Off the Charts, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 22, 2009, at 10 (noting that U.S. will "have to turn to other buyers, including Ameri-
can citizens . . . to finance the deficits."). See also Rob Copeland, Treasury's Debt Plan: More
Sales of TIPS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at C4 (government to announce plans to increase sales
of inflation-protected bonds because China prefers them). Indeed, there is also the risk that
even if foreign countries wanted to continue to buy U.S. debt, they may not have enough sav-
ings. William Eagle, G20 to Discuss Future of Economic Stimulus, VOICE OF AM., Sept. 21, 2009,
available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-21-voa52.cfm ("'I do not think I will buy
government bonds any more to finance this debt because I am not sure that the [U.S.] will be in
a position to pay the bonds back.' . . . It is also said all the world's savings are not large enough to
[pay for] the deficits that the United States will produce over the next 10 years," quoting a
Canadian expert).
13. See, e.g., Tom Raum, Mountain of Debt: Rising Debt may be Next Crisis, Associated Press,
July 3, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=7995188; Dirk J. Bezemer,
This is not a Credit Crisis - It is a Debt Crisis, 29(3) ECON. AFF. 97 (Sept. 2009). See also
ROBERT D. HORMATS, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: PAYING FOR AMERICA'S WARS 298-99 (Henry
Holt & Company 2007) ("Decades of success in mobilizing enormous sums of money [for wars
and other] governmental needs have led Americans to believe that ample funds will be readily
available in the event of a future . . . emergency. But that can no longer be assumed. Budget
constraints could limit the availability or raise the cost of resources to deal with new emergen-
cies. If government debt continues to pile up, deficits rise to stratospheric levels, and heavy
dependence on foreign capital grows, borrowing the money needed will be very costly.").
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be part of the long-term solution, but this debate has hardly
begun.14
To help fund the government, many think the U.S. will need to raise
taxes,15 just as many states1 6 and other countries17 are contemplating
or have enacted tax increases in light of budget problems brought on
by the global economic crisis. The Department of Treasury estimates
that the expected increase of the present highest marginal income tax
14. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE
OVER TAXES 309 (MIT Press 4th ed. 2008). The Social Security Administration confirms the dire
situation the Social Security Trust fund is in, recently predicting that program costs will start
exceeding program revenues in 2016 and the fund will be exhausted by 2037, citing the current
economic crisis as an aggravating factor. Mark Lassiter, Social Security Board of Trustees: Eco-
nomic Downturn Leads to Worsening of Long-Range Financing Outlook (May 12, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/trustee09-pr.htm.
15. Roger C. Altman, We'll Need to Raise Taxes Soon, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at A15. Mr.
Altman was Deputy Secretary of the Treasury under President Clinton. See also John Fund, The
Weekend Interview with David Walker: Warning: The Deficits are Coming!, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5,
2009, at All (reporting interview with David Walker, former head of the Government Account-
ability Office, "taxes are going up, for reasons of math, demographics and the fact that elements
of the population that want more government are more politically active."); The Small Business
Surtax, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A12 (opining that predictions from 2008 that Obama would
need to raise income tax rates to nearly 60% are likely to materialize); McKinnon, supra note 6 (
"Center for American Progress says the size of projected budget gaps requires considering op-
tions including tax increases."); Alexander Bolton, Buffett Tells Dems Rich Need To Pay More,
HILL, Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/58129-buffett-to-meet-with-
senate-dems#.
16. See Conor Dougherty, States and Towns Lean on Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2009, at
A5; States Balancing Budgets With Income Tax Increases, NCSL Says, ST. TAX TODAY, July 21,
2009 (citing increases in tax rates and/or tax bases in California, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachu-
setts, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin). Income tax rates have also been
recently raised in North Carolina. North Carolina Lawmakers Approve, Governor Will Sign
Budget With Tax Increases, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 6, 2009. Governors in Connecticut and Penn-
sylvania are also contemplating tax rate increases. Connecticut Governor Proposes Revised
Budget With Tax Increases, ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 3, 2009; Brad Bumsted & Mike Wereschagin,
Pennsylvania Governor RENDELL SAYS Tax INCREASE A MUST, MCCLATCHY-TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
June 17, 2009.
17. In June, the OECD recommended that EU states raise taxes or stop planned tax cuts.
OECD Pushes For Tax Increases, Delayed Tax Cuts, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, June 26, 2009.
Meanwhile, many countries have increased taxes or are likely to. Anthony Faiola, WORLD'S
WEALTHY PAY A PRICE IN CRISIS; NATIONS RAISE TAXES, TIGHTEN REGULATIONS, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 15, 2009, at Al. For other countries, see, e.g., John F. Burns, BRITISH PLAN TO RAISE
Taxes AND DEBT SETS OFF POLITICAL SPARRING, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A4 (individual
income taxes); Vanessa Houlder, Corporate Tax Rises Widely Feared, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009,
at 4 (UK); Spain Looks to Tax Increases to Rescue Economy, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept.
29, 2009; Mexico Proposes Tax Increases as Part of 2010 Budget, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept.
10, 2009; ALKMAN GRANITSAS, Greek Voters Consider a Leftist Economic Remedy - Socialists
Gain Support for Elections Sunday With an Offer to Tax the Rich, Spend More and Run the
Government Better, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, at A14; Alkman Granitsas, Greeks Vote Socialists
Into Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at A13 (describing how the socialist party, having just won
election, plans to raise taxes); Tax Increases Inevitable In France?, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY,
Aug. 5, 2009.
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rate of 35% to its recent maximum of 39.6% for individual taxpayers
will generate revenue of nearly $13 billon in 2011 to as high as $44
billion in 2019.18 Furthermore, these revenue increases are projected
to be approximately 50% higher if the current 15% tax on qualified
dividends and long term capital gains is increased to 20% for wealth-
ier taxpayers. 19
Our own revenue estimates computed from raising the marginal
rate to 39.6% are slightly higher than the Treasury's. Of approxi-
mately 96 million tax returns filed for 2007, approximately 4.5 million
reported adjusted gross income (AGI) over $200,000, many of which
likely faced a 33% or 35% marginal tax rate.20 These 4.5 million tax-
payers reported a combined taxable income of approximately $2.4 tril-
lion. If we assume approximately $1.5 trillion of this amount would be
subject to a marginal tax rate of 39.6% rather than 35%, we project
that approximately $71 billion per year in additional taxes would be
raised.21
Whether we use the Treasury's recent estimate or our own, it is
doubtful the income tax rate increase to 39.6% will be sufficient to
raise the amount of funds the U.S. needs to make a dent in deficit
spending and debt pay down. Obviously, one solution is to raise mar-
ginal tax rates even higher. For example, extending our estimate of a
$71 billion increase when rates are raised to 39.6%, it is possible an
additional $83 billion (up to approximately $154 billion) would be
raised if the 35% rate was instead raised to 45%.22
However, it is clear that as a political matter, it will be difficult to
raise income tax rates, especially raising the highest marginal rate
18. As of May 2009, the Department of Treasury's so-called "Green Book" is contemplating
marginal tax rates in 2011 to rise above the current 35% rate to 36% for certain taxpayers and to
39.6% as the highest bracket, since the tax rate reductions of earlier this century automatically
revert to their prior levels. It also proposes raising the capital gains and qualified dividend tax
rate from 15% to 20% for high income taxpayers. "High income" is determined by levels of
adjusted gross income, net of standard deduction and personal exemptions, and is in the area of
$200,000 to $250,000, based on marital status. Table 1 of the Green Book sets forth the projected
revenue from the tax increases. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., General Explanations of the Adninis-
tration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals (May 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/
offices/tax-policy/library/grnbkO9.pdf [hereinafter Green Book].
19. Id. at Table 1.
20. Based on data from the following: I.R.S., Publication 1304, Table 1.4, available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil07inl4ar.xls. Of these 4.5 million returns, just over one million reported
AGI above $500,000, and approximately 390,000 reported AGI over $1 million.
21. This calculation assumes $200,000 is the cutoff before marginal tax rates reach their cap.
The estimate of $71 billion is likely overstated because, for example, parts of this taxable income
are likely taxed at favorable rates, such as qualified dividends and long-term capital gains.
22. One may argue that it is not simply a matter of doubling the tax rates to receive double
the amount of gross dollars since higher tax rates might lead to lower taxable income due to
potential disincentive effects for taxpayers incurring this additional tax expense.
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above the 39.6% rate that existed at the start of this century in the
start of the Bush term. During the presidential campaign, candidate
Obama needed to counter candidate McCain's characterization of
Obama as "redistributor in chief" and that McCain would keep taxes
lower.23 When pressed during the campaign on whether he would
raise taxes, Obama conceded that he would allow many Bush tax cuts
to revert to prior levels, but only for those earning over $250,000.24
Candidate Obama knew then, and also appreciates now that he is in
office, how difficult it is to raise income tax rates.25 Even recent ex-
amples of proposals to raise tax rates beyond 39.6% or to scale down
allowable tax deduction for the wealthy find the Democrats couching
the changes in terms of paying for health care reforms. 26 Any whisper
of Democratic attempts to raise tax rates immediately is criticized, es-
pecially if it is perceived as violating Obama's campaign promise of
not raising taxes on those earning under $250,000.27
While marginal income tax rates have been as high as 94% during
World War II and 92% during the Korean War, the highest rates
23. See, e.g., Jeff Mason, McCain, Obama Present Different Views on Taxes, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 10, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/06/10/mccain
obamastakeoutdivergent-paths ontaxes/.
24. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Campaign '08: McCain vs. Obama: In the General Election, Sharp
Battle Lines Over Policy, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at A7.
25. For an exhaustive review of the history (and retreat) of progressive taxation in the U.S.,
see Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of
Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REV. 905 (1996). For more recent papers, see Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., The State of Federal Income Taxation Symposium: Rate, Progressivity, and Budget
Process: Symposium Article: The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 993, n.109
(Sept. 2004) (citing papers summarizing the history of progressive taxes in the U.S.).
26. See, e.g., Greg Hitt & Martin Vaughan, Health Bill in House Relies on Wealth Tax, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 2009, at Al; John D. McKinnon, DEMOCRATS TARGET HIGH EARNERS TO HELP
FUND HEALTH PLAN, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A4.
27. In an August 2009 press release, the Republicans on the House Ways & Means Committee
cited a Washington Post article: "While President Obama had previously called for extending
Republican-enacted tax cuts for families earning less than $250,000, the Washington Post is re-
porting that, 'in light of the new deficit figures, [OMB Director] Orszag hinted that Obama may
revisit some of those decisions when he submits his next budget in February.'" OBAMA FLOATS
ANOTHER MIDDLE CLASS TAX HIKE TRIAL BALLOON; Administration Issues Second Tax Hike
Warning in August (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://republicans.waysandmeans.house.gov/
News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=142402 (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). However, the
Washington Post article, which the Republican press release provides a hyperlink to, does not
contain such a quote. See Lori Montgomery, DEFICrr PROJECTED TO SOAR WITH NEW PRO-
GRAMS; 10-YEAR ESTIMATE OF $9 TRILLION FUELS CRrIcs OF PRESIDENT'S AGENDA, WASH.
POST, Aug. 26, 2009, at Al. The Washington Post informs us that the Republicans cited an early
online version of the article, which was later clarified when it went to final posting on the website
as well as in print. See also McKinnon, supra note 6 (citing Obama Press Secretary immediately
disavowing implications from September 2009 Sunday television comments from each of
Obama's Treasury Secretary and Economic Adviser that failed to rule out middle class tax
increases).
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dropped precipitously when President Reagan entered office in 1981.
At 70% in 1980, the highest rate was decreased to 50% and then to
28% by 1988 at the end of Reagan's presidency, and then it rose back
up, when President Clinton raised it to 39.6% starting in 1993.28
Whether Republicans or Democrats have been in control, it has been
difficult to move marginal income tax rates back beyond 39.6%.29
It is possible that Congress may seek to increase tax revenues not
only by allowing the marginal tax rates to revert to 39.6% but also by
expanding the income tax base.30 For example, Congress is contem-
plating taxing certain health insurance benefits.31 Also, "stealth taxes"
may help raise effective marginal tax rates, such as the current propo-
sal to reinstate the phase out of total itemized deductions and per-
28. Historical income tax rate data is provided at the following: I.R.S., Personal Exemptions
and Individual Income Tax Rates, 1913-2002, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02inpetr.
pdf. It is interesting to note that during World War II, President Roosevelt issued an executive
order limiting salaries to $25,000 after taxes "'in order to correct gross inequities and to provide
for greater equality in contributing to the war effort.' Taking the position that for reasons of
'morale,' 'no American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more
than $25,000 a year,' Roosevelt had proposed 'a special war supertax' to limit a married couple's
after-tax income from all sources to $50,000. Congress, which nullified his executive order,
never acted on his proposal to enact the supertax." Linder, supra note 25, at 940 (footnotes
omitted). In more recent times Congress, in egregious cases, has sought to enact what amounts
to a confiscatory tax. For example, Congress toyed with the possibility in early 2009 of taxing, at
a rate of 90%, bonuses paid to certain employees of American International Group, Inc. (AIG),
a recipient of government bailout money. See, e.g., Greg Hitt & Aaron Lucchetti, House Passes
Bonus Tax Bill -- 90% Hit Would Affect Major Banks; Senate Mulls Similar Action Amid AIG
Furor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at Al. There have also been excess profits tax regimes, which
seek to tax profits of business above certain minimum thresholds. See, e.g., Anita Wells, Legisla-
tive History of Excess Profits Taxation in the United States in World Wars I and I, 4 NAT'L TAX J.
237 (Sept. 1951); E. Gordon Keith, The Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 193 (Sept.
1951).
29. See Linder, supra note 25.
30. Government may also seek to expand or create tax bases other than the income tax base.
One example is the current discussion of a national consumption or value-added tax. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Mitchell, VATs Mean Big Government, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2009, at A15. Another
example is the cap-and-trade approach to energy, which many argue amounts to a new tax on
energy. See, e.g., INHOFE To KERRY: Cap-AND-Trade is DEFINED As Tax, A GREAT BIG ONE,
U.S. FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 28, 2009; Nick Snow, CBO Says HR 2454 Would Add $846
Billion in Taxes, OIL & GAS J., June 15, 2009. The CBO report, dated June 5, 2009, is available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/docl0262/hr2454.pdf. A third example is not allowing the es-
tate tax to be repealed. See, e.g., Martin Vaughan, Bid to Block Estate-Tax Repeal, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 2009, at D3; Jonathan Weisman, Estate Tax Faces Its Own Life-and-Death Struggle,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2009, at AS.
31. See, e.g., Laura Mecler et al., Obama Backs Health Surtax: Proposal Targets Millionaire
Families to Help Fund Overhaul of Medical Care, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at Al; Janet
Mosenbach, Income Taxation of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 124 TAX NOTES 478
(2009); Janet Adamy & Greg Hitt, Tax ON 'CADILLAC' PLANS DRAWS FLAK, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 2009, at A4.
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sonal exemptions for high income taxpayers, which expires in 2010,32
or by recent proposals such as reducing the marginal tax benefit of
itemized deductions to 28% for taxpayers in a higher tax bracket. 33
Even if these three items are implemented, the Treasury expects only
between $16 billion and $66 billion a year to be raised.34 Again, these
will not be enough to provide sufficient cash flow for the government
over the next decade.
III. THE COMPULSORY BOND PURCHASE PROPOSAL
It is not the intent of this Article to enter the political and economic
debates over the merits or downsides of progressive taxation. It is
also not our intention to implement a penalty on excessive compensa-
tion, along the lines of Internal Revenue Code Sections 162(m) or
409A.3 5 Instead, we proceed with the assumption that the federal gov-
ernment must raise cash flow, and if the public will not stand for mar-
ginal income tax rates above 39.6%, and if other methods of raising
revenues are insufficient, we propose a compromise.
The proposed approach calls for increased cash flow to the govern-
ment by requiring taxpayers earning high levels of certain types of
income to purchase bonds from the government. As detailed further
below, we believe that taxpayers who receive income from employ-
ment and self-employment above a certain level are best situated to
help provide cash flow for the government. However, the approach
does not impose an expense on these taxpayers. Every student of ac-
counting learns that cash outflow is not necessarily the same as an
expense. In this case, the individual's balance sheet is not impacted - a
current asset (cash) is exchanged for a longer term asset (bond). Fur-
thermore, if we consider the U.S.'s aggregate "income statement,"
when the U.S. pays interest on internal debt (i.e., debt held by its citi-
zens, also frequently referred to as "we owe it to ourselves"), aggre-
32. Green Book, supra note 18, at 75-76. By "stealth tax," we refer to the effective incremen-
tal marginal rate that applies to taxpayers beyond the nominal marginal tax rate because many
tax benefits decrease and burdens increase as AGI escalates. See Stephen J. Entin, Mommy,
What's a Stealth Tax?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2003, at A14, for a layman's discussion. Earlier
proposals, which expected to raise an average of $30 billion a year by limiting specific deductions
(e.g., charities, interest expense) for high income taxpayers, have apparently failed to progress.
See, e.g., John D. McKinnon & Martin Vaughan, White House Rethinks Tax Hikes: Obama Open
to Revising Plan to Cap Breaks on Mortgage Interest and Donations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at
A3; McKinnon, supra note 26.
33. Green Book, supra note 18, at 87.
34. Data calculated from Green Book, supra note 18, at 128-130 (Table 1 and Appendix A).
35. For a recent article discussing such issues, see Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Acci-
dents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWiS & CLARK L. REV.
485 (2009).
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gate U.S. income is not impacted because the government's interest
expense equals its citizens' interest income. Contrast that to the set-
ting in which the U.S. borrows from creditors outside the U.S.-the
U.S.'s interest expense is not offset by its citizens' matching income:
instead, the interest leaks beyond the U.S.'s borders.
We propose to raise marginal income "tax" rates targeted to per-
sonal service income. This includes salaries of employees and net
earnings from self-employment of all others. However, we only target
such income over $500,000 a year under the following rate structure:
* $500 thousand to 1 million: 45%
* 1 to 2 million: 50%
* 2 to 4 million: 55%
* 4 to 6 million: 60%
* 6 to 10 million: 65%
* 10 to 25 million: 70%
* Above 25 million: 75%36
Personal services income below $500,000 and all other income will be
taxed in the normal fashion.
However, the excess charge over 39.6% is not permanently lost to
the taxpayer. Instead, it is converted to bonds for which the federal
government is obligor. The government will annually pay interest on
the bonds to the taxpayer at the then current rate of inflation, in a
fashion somewhat similar to the Treasury's I-Bonds.37 Furthermore,
we propose that this interest be taxed similarly to I-Bonds, currently
taxable by the federal government and tax-exempt for state tax
purposes.
Unlike conventional bonds, these bonds will not have a fixed matur-
ity or be transferable by the holder. Instead, the bonds begin to ma-
36. We stop our rate increases at 75% for two reasons. First, most states impose income tax,
with some being as high as 11% (e.g., Hawaii, discussed supra note 16), and our targeted
taxpayers would likely also have to pay Medicare tax (1.45% for employees, approximately 2.9%
for self-employed). To impose a charge that in some cases might approach 90% appears
confiscatory in nature. We believe that there should be some spendable cash flow derived from
the good fortune of such steep salaries, even beyond $25 million. Linder, supra note 25, at 923
and accompanying text, cites Republican Senator Reed, arguing to cut tax rates in 1956 down to
75%: "it seems reasonable enough that any individual be permitted to keep at least one quarter"
of his income. As to our starting point of $500,000, we chose this number because it is double
the $250,000 amount that was often used by Obama during and after the campaign as a threshold
amount for considering who would not see possible tax rate increases. See Meckler, supra note
24 (discussing the $250,000 threshold).
37. U.S. Dept. of the Treas., TreasuryDirect, I-Bonds Rates & Terms, available at http://www.
treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ibonds/res-ibondsiratesandterms.htm. Another bond
vehicle offered by the U.S., also designed to protect against inflation, is the so-called TIPS, See
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/
research/indepth/tips/res-tips.htm. See Copeland, supra note 12 (describing China's preference
for the protection of TIPS).
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ture once the taxpayer turns 70 years old, under rules similar to the
distribution requirements for Individual Retirement Accounts, includ-
ing paying out as an annuity over the remaining expected life of the
taxpayer. The bonds would be paid earlier in several cases. First, the
bonds are redeemed upon death of the taxpayer, at which point the
principal amounts are paid to the human beneficiaries of the taxpayer
or to U.S. charities designated by the taxpayer. If the beneficiaries are
humans, they will be paid in the form of an annuity over their ex-
pected remaining lifetimes.
There are two other instances in which we propose that the bonds
may be redeemed earlier. First, the federal government may redeem
them at any time, with no early redemption premium. For example,
the federal government may encounter budget surpluses - similar to
those last enjoyed under President Clinton. It is conceivable that a
technological breakthrough, such as discovery of a new energy source,
could provide the U.S. government with a 21st century version of the
post-Cold War "peace dividend" or Clinton's "internet boom." Re-
turning funds in future "good" years to bond holders who provided
cash flow in the difficult years is more equitable than an approach that
lowers tax rates in future "good" years, because the beneficiaries of
reduced tax rates may not necessarily be the same individuals who
suffered high taxes during the difficult years.
Second, for certain hardships during the taxpayer's lifetime,
amounts necessary to pay costs related to the hardship may be permit-
ted. In this case, rules similar to those used to avoid 10% penalties on
early withdrawals from pre-tax retirement accounts may be applied
(e.g., medical bills).38 We also propose that the bonds be available for
liquidation in the event of the taxpayer's bankruptcy in order to pay
debts to unrelated parties.
At this initial stage of consideration, we believe taxpayers should
not be permitted to post the bonds as collateral for loans. Our con-
cern is that a "market" for the bonds may indirectly occur, which
might violate the spirit of our design that the bonds not be transfera-
ble before the maturity dates indicated earlier.
Finally, we recommend that the redemption of the principal of the
bonds not be a taxable event for income tax purposes, since it will be
viewed as a return of capital. However, just as is the case with most
other savings vehicles, we expect the bonds to be part of the dece-
dent's taxable estate. Therefore, methods currently employed to
avoid estate tax can be used to shield estate tax on the bonds, such as
38. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2) (2009).
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the decedent leaving the bonds to a spouse or donating to a U.S.
charity.
IV. ESTIMATES OF CASH FLOw FROM BONDS
In this section we provide rough estimates of how much money pos-
sibly could be raised from the bond sales. The first computation,
made with assumptions that likely underestimate the bond purchase
calculations, estimates how many bonds would be sold to the taxpay-
ers for whom we have aggregate Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data.
For the approximately 18,000 taxpayers with over $10 million in AGI
in 2007, we project that they would have purchased approximately $20
billion in bonds under the proposal.39 For the 28,000 taxpayers with
AGI between $5 and $10 million, the amount is $10 billion;40 for the
109,000 taxpayers with between $2 and $5 million of AGI, the amount
is at least $5 billion.41 These calculations show that it can be expected
that at least $35 billion of bond purchases would occur per year; if
conservative assumptions we employ in our calculations were relaxed,
it is likely that these estimates would be doubled. 42
Forecasting based on aggregate data is obviously difficult. Further-
more, detailed information on salaries of specific taxpayers is not pro-
vided by the IRS nor is it publicly available. Nonetheless, we have
attempted to calculate how much in bonds could be sold based on the
39. This calculation is derived from statistics provided in IRS Publication 1304, supra note 20.
For ease of calculation, the $20 billion figure assumes salary income and business profits are
earned evenly among the taxpayers, and that a tax return that reports salaries does not report
business profits (and vice versa). Due to the progressive nature of the bond purchase rates, these
assumptions dramatically underestimate the purchases. There were over 18,000 tax returns with
total AGI of $561 billion that each reported AGI over $10 million. Of these returns, 15,000
reported salaries of $90 billion and 13,000 reported $89 billion of business/profession and part-
nership/Subchapter S income.
40. This calculation is determined in a fashion similar to the method described in note 39.
There were over 28,000 tax returns with total AGI of $192 billion that each reported AGI be-
tween $5 and $10 million. Of these returns, 23,000 reported salaries of $52 billion and 21,000
reported $41 billion of business and partnership/Subchapter S income.
41. This calculation is determined in a fashion similar to the method described in note 39.
There were 109,000 tax returns with total AGI of $325 billion that each reported AGI between
$2 and $5 million. Of these returns, 87,000 reported salaries of $104 billion and 80,000 reported
$80 billion of business and partnership/Subchapter S income.
42. As detailed supra note 39, we make assumptions that underestimate the calculation of
purchases. These assumptions also lead to the inability to trigger purchases by those with AGI
under $2 million. A very rough calculation that suspends these assumptions approximately
doubles the amount of likely sales to those with AGI over $2 million. It also would allow us to
calculate bond purchases by those with AGI under $2 million. There were nearly 900,000 tax
returns with total AGI of $765 billion that each reported AGI between $500,000 and $2 million,
reporting $335 billion of salaries and $180 billion of business and partnership/Subchapter S in-
come. Note that 726,000 taxpayers reported the salaries of $335 billion; however, again, we do
not know how many of these earned over $500,000 in salaries.
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personal service income of 1,155 individuals for whom estimated earn-
ings information is available through public sources.
In the sport of baseball alone, the top one hundred paid players will
earn an average of $13 million in 2009.43 High salaries are also paid to
athletes in other major team sports, such as basketball, football, and
hockey, and prize winnings are in the multiples of millions for the elite
players in golf, auto racing, and boxing.44 The most financially suc-
cessful celebrities and performers in the arts, such as actors and musi-
cians, also annually earn in the millions of dollars, oftentimes more
than most sports figures.45 Furthermore, many of these public figures
earn millions in endorsement deals and appearance fees. Turning to
the business world, in 2007, there were nearly 1,000 reporting officers
of publicly traded firms who each earned over $1 million in salary and
bonus.46
We calculate $1.487 billion as a rough estimate of the amount of
bonds that would be sold to these individuals, summarized in Exhibit
1. This calculation is determined by taking the individual's reported
income and applying our proposed rates listed above. We ignore any
tax deductions or tax shelters these individuals may actually have, as
we assume they likely offset other income they may have, such as
portfolio income. The "Bonds Sold" column represents the additional
funds the U.S. government would annually receive above the tax rate
of 39.6%.
43. Calculations based on salary data in Associated Press, Baseball's Top 100 Highest-Paid
Players, Fox SPORTs, Apr.9, 2009, available at http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:ihnYdlDn
ChUJ:feeds.foxsports.com/mlb/story/9434658/Baseball%27s-top-100-highest-paid-players-+fox+
sports+baseball%E2%80%99s+top+100+highest-paid+players&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
44. For a list of the highest paid fifty athletes in 2007, see Jonah Freedman, Ranking the 50
Highest-Earning Athletes in the U.S., SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, available at http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/more/specials/fortunate50/2008/index.html. For our calculations in Exhibit 1, the ath-
letes who are baseball players have been removed to avoid duplication.
45. For data on these celebrities, see The Celebrity 100, FORBES, June 3, 2009, available at
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/53/celebrity-09_The-Celebrity-10O-EarningsPrevYear.html.
46. Data provided by Compustat, a service of Wharton Research Data Services. Frequently,
these employees also enjoy additional income based on factors outside their control, such as
stock-based compensation windfalls or severance/golden parachutes. However, to be conserva-
tive, we omitted these amounts from our calculations. Because data on publicly traded firms'
compensation for key insiders is readily available, there are many studies of this data. For exam-
ple, Forbes analyzes the total compensation of CEOs at the top 500 publicly traded firms. They
report an average salary for these top 500 CEO's of $11.4 million. Scott DeCarlo, What the Boss
Makes, FORBES, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/22/compensation-
chief-executive-salary-leadership-best-boss-09-ceo-intro.html. See also Ellen E. Schulz, Pay of
Top Earners Erodes Social Security, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at C4 (reporting that highly paid
employees, including primarily executives, received nearly $2.1 trillion of the $6.4 trillion in total
U.S. pay in 2007). NOTE THAT THE SUM OF THE SALARIES REPORTED IN IRS DATA FOR THOSE
WITH AGI OVER $500,000 IS APPROXIMATELY A QUARTER OF THE $2.1 TRILLION. See IRS Publi-
cation 1304, SUPRA notes 20.
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EXHIBIT 1: Summary of Projected Bonds Sold for Various Taxpayers
(dollar amounts in millions)
Number of Services Bonds
Taxpayers Income Sold
Celebrities 25 $2,168 $ 707
Athletes (Other than Baseball Players) 44 1,089 294
Baseball Players 100 1,307 280
Key Employees at Publicly Traded Firms 986 2,062 206
1,155 $6,626 $1,487
Extrapolating from these calculations to the full population is diffi-
cult. It seems reasonable to speculate that this amount would be
much larger when we factor in all other taxpayers earning over
$500,000 in annual personal service income. For example, there are
approximately three thousand other players in the four major team
sports not accounted for above, many of whom also earn over
$500,000. There are countless profitable privately held firms, for
which salary information is not publicly available, but at which man-
ager salaries are likely comparable to publicly traded firms. 4 7 Turning
to professional service firms, the average partner earns $1.26 million
at the 100 top-grossing law firms, 48 and clearly there are thousands of
partners/directors/key executives in accounting 49 and other consulting/
personal/financial service firms who also earn over $500,000.50
If only 1,155 individuals can generate nearly $1.5 billion in bond
sales - we concede that they are likely at the high end of earners - it
seems reasonable to expect that it is possible to achieve the minimum
of $35 billion we estimated previously based on aggregate IRS data
for the 155,000 taxpayers with AGI over $2 million. After relaxing the
assumptions made in making those aggregate calculations, including
all who earn over $500,000 a year, it would not be surprising if ulti-
47. The estimated average salary of 302,000 chief executive officers in all industry sectors
across the U.S. is $160,440; information is not provided on how many earn over $500,000. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, May 2008 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimate, avail-
able at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes-nat.htm#bO0-0000.
48. Aric Press & John O'Connor, Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May 1, 2009. The
estimated average salary of 554,000 lawyers is $124,750 (a figure that includes non-partners);
information is not provided on how many earn over $500,000. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra
note 47.
49. THE AVERAGE NET INCOME PER CPA FIRM PARTNER Is $407,000 FOR FIRMS WITH MORE
THAN 50 EMPLOYEES. EXCLUSIVE SURVEY: KEY DATA HELP STRATEGIC FIRMS WrrH 2009
PARTNERSHIP PLANNING, PARTNER's REPORT, Jan. 2009. This average was likely brought down
by the many CPA firms other than the "Big 4."
50. For example, the estimated average salary of 34,000 anesthesiologists is $197,570; informa-
tion is not provided on how many earn over $500,000. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 47.
[Vol. 8:37
PROPOSAL: COMPULSORY BOND PURCHASE
mately nearly $100 billion in bonds are sold per year to hundreds of
thousands of taxpayers.
V. COMPULSORY BONDS AS TOOL FOR AMERICANS TO SAVE AND
REINVEST IN THE U.S.: A 21ST CENTURY "WAR BOND"
In a sense, the proposed compulsory bonds are akin to "War
Bonds" sold by the U.S. government to help fund its wars in centuries
past. While the onset of the current economic crisis was more attribu-
table to a crisis of confidence in markets rather than the fact that the
U.S. is presently engaged in two protracted military actions in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the current demands on government are similar to
the demands of past large wars. Robert Hormats, writing shortly
before the economic crisis that unfolded at the end of 2008, summa-
rized the history of U.S. financing of wars:
For much of America's history, the White House and Congress have
recognized the inevitability of massive borrowing when the nation's
security has been threatened, and for the most part they have tried
to structure that borrowing to strengthen national unity. Hamilton
called a well-funded debt a "national blessing" because it gave
Americans who held federal securities an interest in supporting the
fledgling post-Revolutionary government. Lincoln saw bond sales
as a way to more closely tie greater numbers of Northerners to the
Union's cause. [Woodrow Wilson's and Franklin Roosevelt's Trea-
sury secretaries] initiated patriotic bond drives to enable Americans
not directly engaged in the world wars to make a contribution.51
Hormats also reports that the "most striking aspect of wartime fi-
nancing was the degree [of Americans'] economic sacrifices.... Fiscal
policy was structured to strengthen support for the war effort by dem-
onstrating that it was being financed fairly, and by using bond drives
as devices for encouraging large numbers of people to demonstrate
their patriotism." 52 Marketers of the bonds provided a "more compel-
ling way to use the concept of the future to sell bonds," presenting
them not as a financial investment but as "an investment in Ameri-
cans' lives and in the nation itself," including the use of posters such as
"Your Bonds Are a STAKE in the Future."53 Furthermore, beyond
war financing, Treasury officials viewed the bond sales as a means to
51. HORMATS, supra note 13, at 290.
52. Id. at 132-33.
53. LAWRENCE R. SAMUEL, PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE: AMERICAN IDENTITY AND THE BOND
DRIVE OF WORLD WAR II 52 (1997).
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curtail the rising threat of inflation, "the home front equivalent of a
treacherous foreign foe."54
We concede that America's war bonds were voluntarily purchased,
by the wealthy and not so wealthy, to show patriotism during war.55
In our proposal, we "impose" patriotism, and it is imposed solely on
the highest earners. However, this may be considered only fair be-
cause the success of many of these individuals is often only made pos-
sible by the success of their country. By taking a stake in their
country's future financial stability, these taxpayers are investing (rein-
vesting) in their country's ability to provide them future success and
security. It also provides a signal to creditor nations that these Ameri-
cans, many of whom have high public profiles, share their risk in in-
vesting in the U.S.
We also concede that collecting cash of between $35 and $100 bil-
lion a year, as we project in Section IV, may not make a dramatic
direct impact on the government's budget. 56 However, this approach
would help instill confidence in foreign creditors. In the business set-
ting, it is not uncommon for lenders (and equity investors) to require
that employees and other equity investors have "skin in the game."
For example, many real estate deals carefully scrutinize loan-to-value
ratios to make sure the buyer/borrower has enough of a down pay-
ment, and many debt covenants on large loans contain ratios related
to levels of debt to equity.
Furthermore, the compulsory bond will help such taxpayers create
and secure their own personal wealth.5 7 Americans are notorious for
54. Id. at 10. Government could not only fund the war, but also stem inflation "simultane-
ously by taking money out of consumers' hands and putting it into its own." Id.
55. It is interesting to note that by 1941 advisors favored Roosevelt to force individuals to buy
the bonds, arguing compulsion would avoid the experience of World War I fund raising, during
which community pressure stigmatized those who would not buy bonds. Ultimately, advocates
of the voluntary purchase approach won, arguing that it would "make the country war-minded"
and "give people an opportunity to do something" more for the war effort. RONALD H. BAILEY,
The Home Front: U.S.A. 108-09 (1978). See also DONALD JOHN MARKWELL, JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ECONOMIC PATHS TO WAR AND PEACE 217-18
(2006) (describing policy makers urging of the Roosevelt administration to adopt a version of
Keynes' compulsory savings/deferred pay proposal (discussed infra notes 67-76 and accompany-
ing text)); SAMUEL, supra note 53, at 29 (because not enough bonds were being sold at one point,
"As a backup, a compulsory savings plan was prepared to be quickly put in place on July 1, 1942,
should the Treasury's bond program continue to falter").
56. For a similar opinion in the context of raising income tax rates, see David Wessel, Taxing
Rich Wouldn't Close the Gap, but would Shrink it, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A4 (also citing
Professor Slemrod - "The 1990's suggests we could raise more money from high-income people
... and still have a strong economy").
57. While this Article is proposing compulsory bond purchases for those making over
$500,000, it is possible to imagine extending the program to middle income taxpayers (or even
lower income taxpayers) if a need arises. See SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 14, at 286-87
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being consumers rather than savers,58 unlike the citizens of many of
our creditor countries.59 While there are debates over whether sup-
pression of consumption might be damaging during an economic re-
covery, all agree savings must increase.60 Many economists agree that
most tax incentives to increase savings have a limited, even ambigu-
ous, impact on net savings.61 In our case, we use the tax law to force
Americans' savings by compelling the bond purchase. 62 As noted by
one author, writing about the war bonds:
From a lay point of view, bonds made one feel richer, whereas taxes
made one feel poorer, and common sense suggested that gaining the
support of ordinary citizens would be easier ... if Americans felt
they were not only contributing to a national cause but also gaining
financially. . . . Bonds would act as a physical reminder of the
owner's stake in the European war, stand as a symbol of unity to
potential enemies, and ultimately be the seeds for postwar eco-
nomic prosperity .... Bonds thus represented not only a means of
combating wartime inflation but a promise of postwar economic sta-
bility and prosperity. 63
Furthermore, by providing for repayment of bond principal to those
taxpayers who bought them, the proposal improves on typical scena-
rios in which government reduces tax rates in good years for all tax-
payers, not just those who paid high taxes in prior years.
Many economists now take seriously the idea that certain people are unable to commit to save as
much as they 'should' and that the problem is particularly severe for low- and moderate-income
people, as both pressures to spend today and the consequences of under-saving are the worst for
this group.. . . This could support a case for going beyond removing distortions [in the tax law as
to incentives] and perhaps subsidizing saving among low-income people, as well as creating insti-
tutions that do a better job of getting low- and moderate- income people in the habit of saving.
58. PETERSON, supra note 3, at 202 (writing before the recent economic crisis, which has
clearly dampened U.S. consumption, "America's propensity to consume and its disinclination to
save are deeply ingrained in the [American] psyche"). Meanwhile, there are signs that U.S.
consumers are continuing their appetite for spending even as their incomes lag, as evidenced by
Commerce Department data for August 2009. Martin Crutsinger, Consumer Spending Jumps 1.3
percent in August, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 1, 2009.
59. For a comparative analysis between 1993 and 2006 of household net saving rates as a
percentage of their disposable income in the U.S. and other countries, see OECD FACTBOOK
2008: Macroeconomic Trends: Economic Growth: Household Saving, available at http://lysander.
sourceoecd.org/pdf/factbook2008/302008011e-02-02-02.pdf.
60. PETERSON, supra note 3, at 202. Additionally, "[n]o one could disagree with [the] objec-
tive" of "a significant increase in net savings by households." Id. Indeed due to the current
crisis, many Americans have cut back on consumption and thus have led to the highest savings
rates in 15 years. Rich Miller & Alison Sider, Surging U.S. Savings Rate Reduces Dependence on
China (Update2), June 26, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=aomel_t5Z5yS. But see Crutsinger, supra note 58 (suggesting that August 2009
data shows Americans may be returning to consuming more than they earn).
61. PETERSON, supra note 3, at 202.
62. Peterson believes that if we wanted a significant increase in net savings "we would have to
make it mandatory." Id. (emphasis in original).
63. SAMUEL, supra note 53, at 11, 15, 29.
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Turning to outside the U.S., there have been instances in other
countries where compulsory loans somewhat similar to our proposal
have been used or contemplated. For example, China has required
employees to lend money to their employers,64 Brazil law allows for
compulsory loans to finance certain public calamities,65 and Israel has
also employed such loans.66 Experience in three other countries - En-
gland, the Soviet Union, and Germany - are discussed next.
In late 1939, the famous economist John Maynard Keynes argued
for a compulsory loan program as a way for England to pay for the
soon-to-arrive World War II and to avoid inflation.67 He proposed
that employers withhold a portion of workers' pay and deposit it with
the government Post Office Savings Bank as a form of compulsory
savings.68 The money would be kept in interest bearing accounts and
64. In China, "[i]n an ideologically inoffensive move designed to make socialist 'worker own-
ership' compatible with individual incentives and profits, enterprises were allowed to issue incen-
tive shares to [workers so that they would have] greater incentives to make the enterprise more
profitable. In the early 1980s, however, as enterprises became insolvent, incentive shares origi-
nally intended to boost worker morale transmogrified into compulsory bonds forced onto em-
ployees by money-losing enterprises as a substitute for monetary compensation." Lan Cao, The
Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 97, 156 (1995).
65. In article 148 of the Brazilian Constitution, the federal union may institute "emprdstimos
compuls6rios," which are compulsory loans to defray extraordinary expenses resulting from pub-
lic calamities, war, and in the event of a public investment that is urgent and of relevant national
interest. Jos6 Marcos Domingues, Environmental Fees and Compensatory Tax in Brazil, 13 LAW
& Bus. REV. AM. 279, 283 (2007). In 1986, in an effort to help combat inflation and draw capital
for projects, the government implemented a compulsory loan, under which a 28% surcharge was
imposed on gas sales and 30% on new car sales. These loans were to be refunded in three years
with interest of 6% a year. Government economists also expected the transfer of funds to the
government to dampen demand for consumer goods. Juan de Onis, $100-BILLION TAX PLAN
BASED ON Compulsory Savings; Brazil MIDDLE CLASS TO FUND AID TO POOR, L.A. TIMES, July
26, 1986, at 3; MICHAEL BRUNO ET AL., INFLATION STABILIZATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF ISRAEL,
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, BOLIVIA AND MEXICO 236 (MIT Press 1988).
66. See description of the loans in Warren L. Young, Tax Illusion and Savings Perception: The
Case of Compulsory Loans, 122 DE ECONOMIST 440 (1970) (describing Absorption loans, De-
fence loans and other loans; some loan certificates, which were long term bonds that bore inter-
est, were linked to the cost-of-living index, and redemption could be opted for on or before bond
maturity and were negotiable, although they were received only after a great lag, and, even after
distribution, market trading in the certificates only proceeded after another long lag).
67. ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, 1937-1946 55
(Viking Press 2000). Keynes argued that citizens had a choice: "compulsory savings or compul-
sory inflation." Id. at 59. Keynesian economics have experienced a revival after the onset of the
2008 economic crisis. See, e.g., Justin Fox, The Comeback Keynes, TIME, Nov. 3, 2008, at 60; The
Keynes Comeback; John Maynard Keynes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 2009, available at http://www.
economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?story-id=14539560 (describing newly published books
about Keynes); Pietro Alessandrini & Michele Fratianni, Resurrecting Keynes to Stabilize the
International Monetary System, 20 OPEN ECONOMIES REV. 339 (July 2009).
68. SKIDELSKY, supra note 67, at 55.
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repayable after the war in installments - the higher the wages, the
lower the repayment percentage.69
Keynes' approach would "drastically [restrict]" the consumption of
the rich "without imposing penal, disincentive tax rates."70 The ap-
proach was the only means whereby "war sacrifices could be in pro-
portion to ability to bear them."71 A contemporary of Keynes
summarized the comparative advantage the compulsory bond ap-
proach had over taxation:
The advantage most urgently claimed for both compulsory lending
and compulsory saving is that, as compared with taxation, they pre-
serve the incentive to work. Workers will be more willing to work
harder and longer if they feel that they are only temporarily de-
prived of the fruits of their labor, and that they may enjoy these
fruits after the war when goods are once more abundant. [Another]
advantage [is] that large total levies on all income groups become
more acceptable when a promissory note is substituted for a tax re-
ceipt. Finally, the compulsory lending and saving schemes would
create a reserve of individual purchasing power for the post-war
period.72
However, the English government objected, with what amounted to
procedural concerns, including a desire for more data on the effects of
the proposal. 73 More critically, Keynes was unable to obtain the sup-
port of workers, who considered it "highly doubtful" that the loans
would be repaid, particularly because of, in their view, the long tradi-
tion of broken promises by the government to workers.74 In the end,
Keynes struck an "unsympathetic chord" with the socialistically in-
clined Labourites.75 While Keynes' plan drew much attention of influ-
ential policy makers in the U.S.,76 his plan was not implemented in
England.
In 1930's Soviet Russia, there was what amounted to a compulsory
deduction from workers' wages for the purchase of government
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. DUDLEY DILLARD, THE ECONOMICS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 252 (Prentice-Hall
1948).
72. Paul Randolph, General Counsel of the Treasury, Fiscal Policy and Inflation, Speech
Before the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Nov. 30, 1942), available at http://
www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/Fiscal/hst29024.htm.
73. SKIDELSKY, supra note 67, at 69-70.
74. DILLARD, supra note 71, at 321 (also pointing out that the workers were concerned that
even if the loans were repaid, inflation would have reduced their value).
75. Id. See also DONALD E. MOGGRIDGE, MAYNARD KEYNES, AN ECONOMIST'S BIOGRAPHY
631 (Routledge 1992) (the left leaning press, Labour party, and trade union leaders were all
hostile to Keynes' plan).
76. MARKWELL, supra note 55, 215-19.
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bonds.77 It was customary for workers at a union local's meeting to
vote to subscribe to the bonds because no worker "dared to oppose a
resolution in a union meeting."7  Early on, workers felt the cash flow
pain and thus started selling off the bonds. 79 The government re-
sponded by requiring permission of a special committee before any
sale, and such permission would be granted only in serious need cases,
such as illness.80 The compulsory bond program continued for several
more decades, including a sharp reduction by 1953, and then was ulti-
mately abandoned in 1957, at which time a twenty year moratorium
on repayment was imposed.'
After World War I ended, Germany was required to make repara-
tions to the victors of the war. This required cash flow. The German
government decided to implement a graduated compulsory loan pro-
gram, to be subscribed to by all persons with over a hundred thousand
marks in property, during the second half of 1922, and such bonds
would not bear interest until the latter part of 1925.82
Although the German post-World War I approach was short-lived,
a version of it was offered in late 2008 by a little-known Social Demo-
crat candidate fighting an uphill battle to be governor of a German
state - his "unconventional idea" was that Germans with cash and real
estate assets over $750,000 (slightly over $1 million) should be forced
to lend the government two percent of their assets for 15 years at an
interest rate no higher than 2.5 percent.8 3 He was quoted as saying:
"A compulsory state bond would be a rapidly effective instrument to
mobilize additional funds to overcome the economic crisis [and]
would be very fair because only the very wealthy would be drawn
on." 84
77. CALVIN B. HOOVER, ECONOMIC LIFE OF SOVIET RUSSIA 251-52 (Macmillan & Co. Ltd
1931).
78. Id. at 251.
79. Id. at 252.
80. Id.
81. ALEC NOVE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. 254, 309, 323-24 (Penguin Press
1969). For a quantitative analysis of the bond's economics, see Franklin D. Holzman, An Esti-
mate of the Tax Element in Soviet Bonds, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 390 (1957).
82. See GERALD D. FELDMAN, THE GREAT DISORDER: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY
IN THE GERMAN INFLATION 428 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997); GUSTAV STOLPER, KARL HAUSER &
KNUT BORCHARDT, THE GERMAN ECONOMY 1870 TO THE PRESENT 81 (Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc. 1967).
83. German Politician Wants Compulsory Bond for Rich People, Spiegel Online, Dec. 22,
2008, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,597945,00.html.
84. Id. In the January 2009 election, this politician and his party failed to beat the incumbent.
World Elections, Hesse 2009: Results, Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://welections.wordpress.com/
2009/01/19/hesse-2009-results/.
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Of the three described approaches, our proposal is closest to the
Keynes approach - the compulsory savings (also known as "deferred
pay") proposal. Because our approach compels purchases from very
high earners, it differs from the Soviet approach, which applied to all
workers and whom, as is the norm in Communist regimes, typically
had the same low salary. Our approach also differs from the German
setting, which calculated the bond purchase based on current wealth,
which is a function of past income of any nature and all endowments.
Our approach is based on current earnings from personal services and
it cannot be viewed as confiscatory as the German approach. Since
our proposal is similar to Keynes' approach, which was defeated pri-
marily because of union worker's objections, our version's targeting of
high earners will help it succeed in the 21st century U.S.
VI. ADDRESSING POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE
COMPULSORY BOND PROPOSAL
A. Is the Bond Purchase a Form of Confiscatory Taxation?
Professor Linder, in his extensive analysis regarding the historical
debate over progressive taxation in the U.S., discusses resistance to
what arguably are confiscatory tax rates. He expresses the view of the
American Bar Association in 1951 as it resisted progressive tax rates
as high as 92%:
Of special interest to the members of the ABA was the claim that
'the elimination of the wealthy and middle class through . .. [pro-
gressive taxation] . . . was absorbed by the democracies from the
Communist Manifesto . . . [and] has made it almost impossible for
lawyers any longer to leave much of an estate.... The same thing is
true of their clients.'85
Linder also cites Senator Dirksen, in 1956, as stating that "If you are
going to have socialism all you need is heavy progressive income tax
and confiscatory estate taxes so that when a man leaves this earth the
government just takes all." 86
The concerns just described are not present under our compulsory
bond program, because the government will not confiscate these ex-
cessive salaries; it merely constrains how the taxpayer can invest them
until the bond is redeemed. Furthermore, as noted earlier, our propo-
sal does not impose an expense on the taxpayer. Instead, it imposes a
constraint on how a portion of their wealth may be used until redemp-
tion, since we require it to be saved (invested in government bonds)
85. Linder, supra note 25, at 957-58.
86. Id. at 967.
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and paid out to the holder when he reaches 70 years old or to his heirs
or charities after death. The government does not permanently keep
the money.
B. Would the Compulsory Bond Program Create
Disincentive to Work?
Another concern that might be raised is whether the compulsory
bond purchase program will deter economic activity of affected tax-
payers. Obviously, to the extent the government needs cash flow and
is compelled to raise taxes, our approach is an improvement in that it
permits the affected taxpayers to maintain their wealth. Andrew Mel-
lon, one of the best known American capitalists and secretary of the
Treasury for over a decade, stated in 1924 that, "it is a well-known fact
that most people of great wealth use a comparatively small amount of
their incomes for their own and their families' personal physical
needs."87 To the extent his view still applies, our proposal continues
to allow taxpayers to save; again, we merely reduce their investment
choices by directing some of their savings into government bonds.
The question arises whether individuals might stop exerting the ef-
forts necessary to earn the excessive amounts that would become sub-
jected to compulsory bond purchases. The loss of such efforts could
be seen as a loss to the economy. Again, we do not seek to fight the
battle over the merits of progressive taxation, including its effect on
incentives to earn; however, we do offer the following arguments in
support of our approach.
The tax law has long been used to provide incentives and disincen-
tives. For example, the tax law provides a reduced tax rate on capital
gains to motivate capital formation. Incentives, such as a 15% (in-
stead of 35%) tax rate on the gains on sales of investments held at
least one year, makes sense when funds could be put to different uses
(e.g., interest on low risk bonds are taxed at high rates, while returns
to stocks, which are often high-risk, are typically taxed at lower rates).
However, there is something very different about tax incentives and
disincentives when we speak of labor. Compensation is paid for labor
and if any time spent performing compensable labor is taxed on the
margin at the same rate, we do not expect that the individual will "go
elsewhere," as they might with their investment funds.88 Except for
87. Linder, supra note 25, at 161.
88. For a discussion of the preference to have compensation taxed as self-employment income
as opposed to employment income, see James E. Long, The Income Tax and Self-Employment,
35(1) NAT'L TAX J. 31 (March 1982). Note that this setting involves the worker continuing to
work: he merely decides whether he does so as an employee or as a self-employed person.
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the choice to not work as discussed below, the employee cannot go to
a country with lower tax rates to work because, as a U.S. citizen, he is
still obliged to pay U.S. income tax.89 In other words, a person's labor
is not as mobile as his capital.
In analyzing labor decisions, economists speak of a "reservation
wage rate," a rate of compensation under which the laborer rejects a
given job. However, one economist recently pointed out that, when
analyzing a tradeoff between the marginal hour of work and leisure, it
is wrong to assume the marginal utility of work is zero beyond the pay
rate because leisure is taken as intrinsically satisfying; in other words,
many economists wrongly view work as having a cost of the value of
the lost leisure.90 To most casual observers, high end earners have a
certain (often necessary) passion for their livelihoods, which provides
them utility; for instance, if an hour of labor generates $100 of salary
and an hour of leisure is worth $100 to the worker, the worker will
prefer to work the marginal hour as long as he derives any enjoyment
from the work itself.
As casual observers of human behavior, most would agree that
some activities by taxpayers would be undertaken regardless of tax
rates. We expect that the highest paid baseball player, Alex Rodri-
guez of the New York Yankees, would play just as hard for $500 thou-
sand a year as he would for his 2009 annual salary of $33 million.0 '
Although often viewed as a clichd or hyperbole, there can still be
sincerity when a prospective job applicant claims he loves the field so
much "he'd work for free." A renowned European basketball player,
Ricky Rubio, was recently quoted as saying that he would play for
free to be able to play in the U.S.A.'s National Basketball
Association. 92
There are probably more than a thousand professional sports play-
ers who earn over $500 thousand a year and likely would play just as
hard whether their marginal tax rate on salary over $500 thousand was
35% or 45%. This is also true of many professionals outside of sports.
Think of the many pro bono cases lawyers take on - or the research
articles tenured faculty continue to publish (probably not a good ex-
ample, given the rarity of professors earning over $500 thousand in
89. Even if the citizen wishes to surrender their U.S. citizenship, it is very difficult to avoid
paying taxes for a long period. See I.R.C. § 877 (26 U.S.C. § 877 (2008)).
90. David A. Spencer, Work for All Those Who Want it? Why the Neoclassical Labor Supply
Curve is an Inappropriate Foundation for the Theory of Employment and Unemployment, 30
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON., 459, 461 (2006).
91. Data available at source reported at supra note 43.
92. Henry Abbott, Ricky Rubio Would Play for Free, June 24, 2009, available at http://myespn.
go.com/blogs/truehoop/0-41-141/Ricky-Rubio-Would-Play-for-Free.html.
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personal services income!). It is also true for actors. For example, in
2001, Keanu Reeves, a box office major attraction, was reported as
not always seeming "motivated by money. In fact, on several films he
has literally handed over part of his salary to other actors or crew." 93
Turning to the corporate world, including highly paid corporate of-
ficers, one could argue that a CEO might prefer to ease up, or perhaps
even retire, rather than work harder for a bonus that will be taxed at
higher rates than before. A half century ago, J. Keith Butters summa-
rized the findings of many who studied executive behavior. The con-
sensus was that taxes are not a determinant in the effort exerted by
executives, given that cash was not their only motivation to work
hard.94 He concluded, "[i]f continued high taxes are required . . . I
know of no evidence pertaining to the United States which indicates
that the harmful effect of taxes on work incentives is currently so
great as to require immediate tax reductions despite these needs." 95
Other articles at the time were of a similar view, not only for corpo-
rate executives but for other occupations as well. 9 6 Papers published
in the subsequent decades confirm the lack of power that taxes have
on labor decisions.97
As noted earlier, a contemporary of Keynes, in summarizing the
comparative advantage the compulsory loan and savings approaches
93. Tom King, A NOT-ALWAYS-EXCELLENT ADVENTURE: ACTION STAR KEANU REEVES
WANTS TO PLAY THE FIELD, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at W8. But see also Linder, supra note
25, at 974-75 (citing comments by tax-cutting President Reagan, himself a former actor, who
noted that some actors would quit after making a certain number of movies rather than pay a
90% tax rate).
94. J. Keith Butters, Taxation, Incentives, and Financial Capacity, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 504, 508
(May 1954) (noting that taxes may impact the use of deferrals, etc.). For more modern exam-
ples, see Abigail Hofman, Work to Live not Live to Work, Euromoney, Oct. 2006 ("Investment
banking is exciting, addictive and financially rewarding. . . . For financiers, money is only part of
[why we work]. Anyone who's been in the industry longer than 15 years and still works for the
money is a failure. However, self-image is often defined by work. 'I am a managing director on
Wall Street. Therefore I am.' And the money is a way of keeping score."); Nathan Cobb, TAKE
THE MONEY AND RUN? NOT THEM - FOR THE WEALTHY, JOB SATISFACTION GOES BEYOND
MAKING RICHES, Boston Globe, May 7, 2000, at Al (interviewing an executive: "We have other
people in the company worth over $100 million, too. . . .'Why do we work?' Because we really
believe we have that mission.").
95. Butters, supra note 94, at 510.
96. George Break, Income Taxes, Wage Rates and The Incentive to Supply Labor Services, 6
NAT'L TAX J. 333, 353 (Dec. 1953) (concluding that "income tax, even with relatively high margi-
nal rates, is not likely to have serious disincentive effects so far as the aggregate supply of labor
services is concerned").
97. See, e.g., D.B. Fields & W.T. Stanbury, Income Taxes and Incentives to Work: Some Addi-
tional Empirical Evidence, 61(3) AM. ECON. REV. 435 (June 1971); Long, supra note 88. See also
Joel Slemrod, The Dynamic Tax Economist, 56(3) TAX LAw. 611, 613 (2003) ("no convincing
evidence that either aggregate labor supply or saving responds in a significant way to
taxes. . . .").
[Vol. 8:37
PROPOSAL: COMPULSORY BOND PURCHASE
had over taxation, noted that their "advantage most urgently claimed,
compared with taxation, [is that they] preserve the incentive to work.
Workers will be more willing to work harder and longer if they feel
that they are only temporarily deprived of the fruits of their la-
bor. . . ."98 In other words, the worker "might well look at the growth
of his total assets." 99 Of course, the prospects of redemption of the
bond would have to be "vivid so that the taxpayer would be glad to
work more in order to accumulate such claims."100
By limiting our compulsory bond charges to personal service in-
come, as opposed to all income, we believe we have limited any disin-
centive effects. There is no reason for bond holders to be as
concerned as holders in the Soviet Union or post-World War I Ger-
many about the value of their investment because we have included
an inflation protection element. Furthermore, even if employees
would not work as hard if they were to be taxed at higher marginal tax
rates, clearly they would not be as de-motivated by a bond purchase
(even if compelled) as they would by an outright tax, for which they
will never see the money again.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
If the proposed approach is implemented, several issues requiring
further consideration will arise. As to more mundane, procedural as-
pects, we note that current tax forms would require some additional
lines, perhaps even a dedicated schedule, to calculate the amounts,
including the segregation of income subject to the bond purchase from
income subject to conventional income tax.
Also, will the approach allow for any form of lifetime income
smoothing? For example, if a taxpayer has $5 million of earnings from
his sole proprietorship in one year, but lost that same amount over the
next three years, how would this be handled? Our current leaning is,
in the interest of ease of administration, not to allow any provisions
similar to net operating loss carryforwards 01 or the long-shelved in-
come averaging approaches.102
98. Randolph, supra note 72. Another advantage is "that large total levies on all income
groups become more acceptable when a promissory note is substituted for a tax receipt." Id.
99. Id.
100. ALBERT G. HART, DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION 122-23 (Twentieth Century Fund
1951) (emphasis in original).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 172(a), (b).
102. Income averaging was repealed for years after 1986. For a layman's description of the
approach, see Robert J. LaConte, How to Handle Ten-Year Averaging and Income-Averaging
Computations for This Season, 20(2) PRACTICAL ACCOUNTANT 41 (Feb. 1987).
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For taxpayers with cross border activities or relations, obviously
there will be complications, primarily in the area of foreign tax credits.
Examples include a Canadian who plays baseball in the U.S. for half
the season, or an expatriate who is working in the U.S. for only three
years. In the past, the IRS appeared to not want to treat refundable-
type taxes as creditable for foreign tax credit purposes,103 while the
U.S.-Israel treaty allows Israeli compulsory loans to be creditable
(with a reversal of the credit when the bond is redeemed). 104 Consid-
eration will also be needed as to how to treat short term assignees to
the U.S., perhaps with provisions similar to "totalization" agreements.
These agreements permit certain expatriates to the U.S. to avoid pay-
ing U.S. social security taxes as long as they are sent to the U.S. for a
short period of time and they are maintained by their current foreign
employer in that country's social security system. 05 We also expect
some administrative complications for employers under expatriate
equalization agreements; these are agreements under which employ-
ers often agree to pay their employees' taxes; which often leads to tax
''gross ups" - how would compulsory bonds (an asset) be treated
under such plans? 106
The IRS would have to be even more vigilant in patrolling for tax-
payers who seek to convert ordinary income into capital gain - or,
under our approach, personal services income into any other kind of
income. However, we do not expect that taxpayers should be penal-
ized for entering into valid deferred compensation arrangements. For
example, if Alex Rodriguez and the New York Yankees agree to a
valid deferral arrangement that meets the currently required rules for
tax deferral, which smoothes out his earnings over 30 years instead of
10; that is acceptable.
As with most newly enacted legislation, transition issues arise. It
may be unfair to impose the bond purchases on those who have, in
their own budgeting minds, already committed part of their future sal-
aries to servicing, for example, costs of their residences. Thus, we rec-
ommend that the plan start no sooner than the tax year after
103. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-187, 1967-1 C.B. 185 (special tax levied by Canada on corporations
was not a tax but a compulsory loan and therefore not creditable since it was refunded, with
interest, 18 to 36 months later). See also Rev. Rul. 59-70, 1959-1 C.B. 186 (describing Brazil's
compulsory loan arrangement and analyzing whether it qualified for foreign tax credit).
104. Article 26, Relief from Double Taxation, 1 2, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
international/article/0,,id=169560,00.html.
105. For example, see the U.S.-U.K. Totalization Agreement, SocialSecurityOnline, available
at http://www.ssa.gov/international/Agreement Pamphlets/uk.html.
106. See Stanley Veliotis, The Effect of the U.S. Stimulus Tax Rebates on Equalization Pro-
grams, 40(3) COMPENSATION & BENEFITS R. 60 (May/June 2008) (describing complications the
2008 Bush tax rebates had on equalization arrangements).
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enactment, and perhaps include a gradual phasing in of the applica-
tion of the rates to bands of income. For example, for the first year,
the 45% rate could be applied to income between $2 and 4 million,
instead of the amount above $500,000; in the following year, the rates
we note above would then apply.
Some may argue that the proposal is fraught with administrative
burdens, leading to transaction costs, both explicit and implicit. They
may object that the IRS is designed to collect taxes, not act as "bank"
or "broker" in terms of its new role of calculating bonds. There are
two responses. First, we do not contemplate that the IRS will manage
any aspect of the bond sales or redemptions other than the initial cal-
culations, based on annual income tax filings, of how many bonds are
to be sold to the taxpayer. All other aspects are to be handled by the
Department of Treasury, just as it handles its other bonds. Second,
even if the IRS took on more than a mere facilitator role, it would not
be the first time the IRS played the role of "banker." In 2008, to help
support the crumbling housing market, a provision of the tax code was
enacted that provided a tax credit for first time home buyers; the
credit is paid back to the government in many cases after passage of
time, and thus, amounts to a loan to the taxpayer.107
Furthermore, there may be marketing concerns in educating the af-
fected public about the proposal. In modern U.S. politics, what we
call something can make all the difference. 08 For example, in the de-
bate over the extent of health care reform in summer 2009, Obama
and his advisors found that they needed to focus on "linguistic strat-
egy." 109 Earlier we described Keynes' difficulty in convincing the
British government to implement his compulsory savings plan. He
later recognized that he had made a "tactical mistake" in talking
about the term "compulsory savings" and later "substituted the more
diplomatic 'deferred pay' in subsequent expositions."' 10 To obtain
107. The first-time homebuyer credit was included in the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3011, 122 Stat. 2654, 2888-92. For homes purchased in 2008,
the credit operates like an interest-free loan because it must be repaid over a 15-year period.
The credit was expanded in 2009 for homes purchased in 2009, increasing the amount of the
credit and eliminating the requirement to repay the credit, unless the home ceased to be the
principal residence within the 36-month period beginning on the purchase date. For more on
this new law, see Carol A. Pettit, CRS Reports On First-Time Home Buyers' Credit, TAX NOTES,
Mar. 20, 2009.
108. See, e.g., FRANK LuNTz, WORDS THAT WORK: IT'S NOT WHAT YOu SAY; IT'S WHAT
PEOPLE HEAR (Hyperion 2007).
109. Jonathan Weisman, Obama Allies Find Words Fail Them, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2009, at
A4. Dr. Luntz (referenced supra note 108) discussed this terminology on an August 25, 2009 Fox
News show, available at http://www.foxnews.com/search-results/m/26037234/war-of-words.htm.
110. SKIDELSKY, supra note 67, at 59.
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better acceptance by the high income earners of the compulsory bond
program, experts should be engaged to review the use of terminology,
perhaps even employing some of the patriotic themes discussed earlier
in connection with helping to influence Americans to voluntarily buy
war bonds. The government should also consider publicizing the plan
to foreign holders and potential buyers of U.S. debt, and highlight
how hundreds of thousands of Americans, including high profile
Americans, now share their risk in a material way.
The current proposal includes bond purchases only for those tax-
payers earning personal services income. It is possible the U.S. gov-
ernment may seek to expand the type of income subject to the
purchases to all types of ordinary income (i.e., all income that is not
taxed at preferential rates, such as capital gains or qualified divi-
dends). However, it may be best to focus any expansion of the base to
income that is not likely to be subject to disincentive effects. Exam-
ples could include income from fortuitous events,111 such as gambling
winnings and punitive damage awards, and income from events for
which performance has already occurred, such as alimony and
pensions.
Finally, this Article does not address the significant macroeconomic
aspects of requiring certain citizens to buy long-term bonds from the
government. For example, economists could disagree on the differen-
tial effects that taxes versus borrowing have on inflation, a topic also
involved in the Keynes' compulsory savings proposal discussed earlier.
While the compulsory bond proposal involves inflation-protected
bonds, the government should also be concerned about the effects of
inflation on citizens who are not the bond holders.112 Also, money
that is borrowed by the government is money that is not available for
investing in industry. For example, a compulsory bond purchaser may
"feel free to reduce savings in other forms."113 Because we view our
proposal as a compromise between the government's need to raise
111. Some may argue that there are aspects of personal services income that are also a fortune
of luck, such as Alex Rodriguez being gifted with an ability to hit a 95 mph baseball, or the case
of a CEO in the right place at the right time, especially if rewarded with stock-based compensa-
tion. See, e.g., MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, Are CEOs Rewarded for
Luck? The Ones without Principals are, 116(3) Q. J. ECON. 901 (2001); Robert Daines et al., The
Good, the Bad and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill (Working Paper), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1291573.
112. For example, nearly half of 266 economists surveyed in August 2009 expect inflation in
the next few years. Sara Murray, Economists are Split on Inflation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2009, at
A4. See also Clive Crook, It is Never Too Early to Fear Inflation, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 14,
2009, at 9: Copeland, supra note 12 (describing China's desire for more TIPS bonds because of
their concern over possible inflation).
113. HART, supra note 100, at 122.
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cash flow during the next several years and the likelihood that the
public will not permit a dramatic enough income tax rate hike, we do
not address these issues further in this Article.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As a means of funding forecasted expenditures as well as reducing
the current national debt, the U.S. government should establish a
compulsory bond purchase program if it is unable to accomplish in-
creases in the marginal income taxes rates. Through this program,
rather than incurring an added tax expense, high service income tax-
payers would receive government bonds for payments incurred past
the standard 39.6% marginal rate. These bonds will provide personal
savings for the taxpayer as well as a method to invest in the country by
delivering the much needed cash flow to the U.S. government. It also
would provide a signal that these affluent and in many cases high-
profile Americans share the risk that foreign creditors have in
America's ability to repay.
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